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INTRODUCTION
At common law, husbands were exempt from
prosecution for raping their wives. Over the past quarter century, this law has been modified somewhat, but
not entirely. A majority of states still retain some form
of the common law regime: they criminalize a narrower
range of offenses if committed within marriage, subject
the marital rape they do recognize to less serious sanctions, and/or create special procedural hurdles for marital rape prosecutions. The current state of the law represents a confusing mix of victory and defeat for the
exemption's contemporary feminist critics. Virtually
every state legislature has revisited the marital rape
exemption over the last twenty-five years, but most
have chosen to preserve the exemption.in some substantial manifestation. With rare exception, moreover,
courts have not invalidated state laws protecting marital rape. Legislative action, rather than any clear judicial statement of constitutional norms, has driven the
partial and uneven modification of the common law
rule.
If the modern opponents and defenders of the
marital rape exemption agree on any question, it is that
their dispute is a new one. The contemporary debate
over the exemption operates on the assumption that
the law's treatment of marital rape first became controversial in the late twentieth century. Supporters of the
exemption frequently assert that women never saw the
need to challenge a husband's conjugal rights until
approximately twenty-five years ago. The drafters of
the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, who
offer the most sophisticated contemporary defense of
the exemption, explain that the rule-"so long an
accepted feature of the law of rape"-has only "recently
come under attack." Judges similarly note that "until
1977 there was no serious challenge to the spousal
exemption," or observe that "[ulntil the late 1970's
there was no real examination of' the subject whatsoever. Prominent modern feminists, in turn, identify
themselves as part of the first organized political opposi1

tion to marital rape, "a reality about which little systematic was known before 1970." To the extent that participants on either side of the debate consider historical
questions at all, they generally content themselves with
a brief citation to Sir Matthew Hale, who wrote the
most influential treatise defending the marital rape
exemption at common law.
This consensual account of the history of marital
rape is founded on a massive historical erasure. As Parts
I through IV of this Article reveal, a husband's conjugal
rights became the focus of public controversy almost
immediately after the first organized woman's rights
movement coalesced in 1848. Over the course of the
next half century, feminists waged a vigorous, public,
and extraordinarily frank campaign against a man's right
to forced sex in marriage. This nineteenth-century
debate over marital rape constitutes a powerful historical record that deserves to be examined in its own right.
It also provides a useful framework from which to assess
and understand the course of the modem debate over
the exemption.
Public discussion and legal decisionmaking about
marital rape have proceeded without knowledge of this
historical struggle. To some extent, this is because existing historical scholarship has not assimilated into the
popular or legal consciousness. But the work that historians of the nineteenth century have done on the feminist call for sexual self-possession in marriage also
remains very incomplete. The leading historical
accounts do not analyze the feminist effort as a legal
protest and a legal demand, made in an attempt to
unseat a deeply rooted common law prerogative and
denied. Instead, they discuss the feminist argument for
a woman's control over her husband's sexual access as a
chapter in the history of birth control or a moral campaign to rationalize sexual desire. This Article also
reveals nineteenth-century feminism's garrulousness
about the supposedly unspeakable. Scholars have frequently assumed that marital rape was a private concern
that nineteenth-century feminists feared discussing in
any public or systematic way. But the historical record
2

makes clear that these advocates not only publicly
demanded the right to sexual self-possession in marriage,
they pressed the issue constantly, at length, and in plain
language.
Excavating the nineteenth-century contest over
the law's treatment of marital rape restores a significant
chapter in the history of the first woman's rights movement in the United States, offering a new perspective
on the commitments and effectiveness of that movement. Historians have often characterized the first
woman's rights movement as narrowly intent on securing gender-neutral rights of access to the public sphere,
with suffrage defined as the movement's overriding and
most radical goal. Yet leading nineteenth-century feminists argued-in public, vociferously, and systematically-that economic and political equality, including even
the vote, would prove hollow, if women did not win the
right to set the terms of marital intercourse. Indeed,
feminists explained a woman's lack of control over her
person as the key foundation of her subordination. This
claim was acutely gender-specific, grounded in the argument that women needed to control the terms of marital
intercourse in order to regulate the portion of their lives
they would have to devote to raising children.
Convinced that women's subordination was ultimately
rooted in the structure of marital relations, feminists
demanded both the right to refuse and viable socio-economic alternatives to submission.
This agenda, admittedly radical, was neither dismissed nor ignored in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, although it never fully transformed customary
norms. The popular prescriptive (advice and instructional) literature on marriage contains strong evidence
that the feminist critique of marital rape resonated with
evolving societal understandings of desirable marital
conduct. Very soon after nineteenth-century feminists
began speaking about a wife's right to her own person,
mainstream prescriptive authors began to offer extended
analyses of the harm that marital rape inflicted. This
prescriptive literature, however, did not challenge a husband's legal right to control marital intercourse. It mar3

shaled, instead, an array of moral, physiological, and
strategic arguments designed to convince husbands to
voluntarily cede discretion over sex to their wives,
promising that the concession would serve the interests
of husbands as well as wives. In the hands of the popular prescriptive literature, the feminist demand for
enforceable rights to protect women from subordination
to their husbands was recast into a series of suggested
strategies for marital mutuality, to be pursued in a husband's interest as he saw fit.
Ultimately, the law of marital rape changed only
incrementally in the nineteenth century, and only in
the context of divorce. As an episode of law reform, the
course of the nineteenth-century feminist campaign
against marital rape illuminates a deep cultural resistance to altering this aspect of the law, at a time when
other aspects of married women's legal status were
beginning to evolve. States willing to augment the
property rights of married women in the middle of the
nineteenth century, or to ratify woman suffrage in the
early twentieth century, were emphatically unwilling to
subject husbands to prosecution for marital rape. At
least in this arena where sexual and reproductive relations were so directly implicated, authoritative legal
sources proved staunchly opposed to the notion of
incorporating into the law a vision of marriage as a
potentially disharmonious, abusive, even dangerous site
of human interaction, in which wives might need and
deserve legal rights against their husbands.
The progress of this nineteenth-century debate on
marital rape sheds new light on the modern contest
over the exemption and helps explain its trajectory. As
Part V discusses, one of the most striking aspects of the
modern defense of the marital rape exemption-not
generally remarked on as such by modem commentators
but clear in the light of history-is that it assumes the
aligned interests of husband and wife. The exemption's
contemporary defenders argue that the rule's continued
existence protects marital privacy and promotes marital
harmony and reconciliation, leaving both husband and
wife better off. In fact, they go farther than that. In the
4

vision of the modern defense of the marital rape exemption, the assumption of aligned interests between husband and wife is so strong that proponents do not
acknowledge that a marital rape exemption might cause
wives harm. The argument assumes that a wife's interests, like her husband's, are fully and consistently served
in a marital relationship shielded from the possibility of
criminal intervention for rape.
This line of reasoning has proven extremely successful, despite contemporary feminist efforts to analyze
the exemption as an instrument of women's legal subordination. To be sure, the marital rape exemption has
undergone more adjustment in the late twentieth century than in the nineteenth. The only change in the
law's treatment of marital rape that nineteenth-century
feminists lived to see consisted of marginal alterations
in the terms on which divorce was available. Over the
past quarter century, in contrast, a minority of states
have eliminated the exemption and the rest have
reduced its scope. But the marital rape exemption still
survives in considerable measure in most states, at a
time when the repudiation of women's legal subordination that was just beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century has been virtually completed as at least a
formal matter. Twentieth-century feminists, like the
nineteenth-century woman's rights movement, have
had an impact on the law of marital rape, but one that
falls far short of their aspirations or their level of success
in other legal contexts.
In part, the dominant consensual vision of the
history of marital rape helps explain why this modem
argument from aligned interests has been so powerful.
When one starts with the assumption that women have
long accepted the marital rape exemption without
protest, the proposition that the exemption continues
to operate to the mutual benefit of husbands and wives
is more likely to seem plausible and even intuitively
convincing. That position might be more difficult to
sustain in light of a history of feminist argument and
advocacy describing a husband's conjugal rights as a crucial constitutive element of women's oppression.
5

Yet it would be farfetched to suppose that the current legislative commitment to maintaining the marital
rape exemption in substantial form, and the judicial
decision not to intervene through equal protection doctrine, would suddenly dissipate if the record of struggle
over marital rape were widely known. If the history of
the nineteenth-century campaign against marital rape
suggests anything, it is that the societal reluctance to
acknowledge the possibility of antagonistic interests and
hurtful behavior in marriage through the granting of
legal rights to women is long-established, deeply embedded, and highly resistant to feminist challenge, particularly where questions of marital intercourse are at stake.
On this view, it is hardly surprising that modem defenders of the exemption have been so inclined to assume
and assert that the historical survival of a husband's
conjugal privileges was uncontested; we have a tremendous cultural need to understand marital relations as
consensual and harmonious, notwithstanding the contrary evidence we confront about the nature of some
unions. The modem defense of the marital rape exemption is one of the most obvious, if odd, manifestations of
that phenomenon. Never do we hear more about the
joys of marital love, trust, and intimacy in a contemporary legal context than when courts, lawmakers, and
commentators justify the preservation of a husband's
legal right to rape his wife.
There is a highly relevant difference between the
environment in which the first organized woman's rights
movement campaigned against marital rape and present
social and legal conditions, however, which suggests that
the future course of the modem campaign against marital
rape need not run parallel to that of its nineteenth-century predecessor. In the nineteenth century, the harm
that a husband's right to marital rape inflicted upon
wives was freely and explicitly acknowledged as a social
matter. In an era still committed to a wide variety of
legal structures subordinating women to men, that
acknowledgment was not enough to convince mainstream writers or authoritative legal sources that the creation of legal rights protecting women against their hus6

bands was an appropriate remedy. The modem defense
of the marital rape exemption, in contrast, obscures and
denies the harm that the rule inflicts upon women. This
has been a crucial tactic because the injury that marital
rape causes is far harder to defend, and the absence of
legal remediation far harder to justify, in a nation now
explicitly committed to women's legal equality. The historical record of struggle over marital rape helps reveal
this harm, making concrete what the marital rape
exemption's contemporary champions have concealed.
In the process, this history provides a foundation upon
which the modern feminist campaign against marital
rape can build.

I. THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION AS IT
WAs ARTICULATED, UNDERSTOOD, AND
DEFENDED IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

A. Women's Legal Status in the Nineteenth
Century
1. The ConsensualAccount of NineteenthCentury Women's History
The notion that a husband's conjugal rights were
not contested until the late twentieth century accords
with a common mode of thinking about women's legal
status. This consensual account of the history of marital
rape does not draw on any factual record, and it would
find no comfort there. As this Article demonstrates, a
husband's conjugal rights generated profound controversy in the latter half of the nineteenth century, virtually
from the moment that the first feminist movement was
organized. The account operates, instead, on a presumption: that longstanding aspects of women's legal
status must have survived to the modern age because
they embody a set of shared norms, long agreed to by
women and men alike.
The premise that women's legal status is the product of consensual agreement is prominent even in many
historical examinations of the first woman's rights
movement. This line of scholarship acknowledges, of
course, that nineteenth-century feminists campaigned
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to overturn laws subordinating women to men. But it
depicts the feminist protest as limited in scope, and ultimately successful in convincing legislatures to reform
the law wherever feminists pushed forcefully for change.
These narratives of the nineteenth-century woman's
rights movement stress the passage of the married
women's property acts in a number of state legislatures,
starting in the 1840s. At common law, married women
had little, or no, right to contract, own property, or sue.
Some of the first married women's property acts modified this common law regime by codifying court decisions that permitted married women to hold their own
property in equitable trusts and by protecting a wife's
real property from her husband's debts. Later statutes,
enacted from the 1850s onwards, granted wives the
right to keep their own earnings. All of this legislation,
however, focused on questions of property distribution
between husbands and wives that were of immediate
practical concern to relatively few women: Only a small
subset of wives in the nineteenth century either owned
real property or worked outside the home. A number of
historians nonetheless describe the married women's
property acts as satisfying feminists' demands for the
reform of marital status law. In this vision, the passage
of the married women's property acts left suffrage as the
most important, controversial, and far-reaching claim of
the woman's rights movement. Suffrage became, these
historians report, "the capstone of women's emancipation." "Nineteenth-century feminists and anti-feminists
alike perceived the demand for the vote as the most radical element in women's protest against their oppression;" feminists were willing to "bypass[] women's
oppression within the family." This account explains
the history of women's legal status in the nineteenth
and early twentieth-centuries as a story of steady liberalization and, ultimately, of consensualism. It suggests
that the demands of the first feminist movement were
all accommodated in turn, with the movement's agenda
completed by the ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920. On this view, feminists never
seriously challenged what remained unchanged-every
8

aspect of the law of marriage that the married women's
property acts did not reach.
The history of the struggle over marital rape complicates this picture. It reveals that the legal demands of
the nineteenth-century feminist movement were not
limited to suffrage and the marginal property reforms at
stake in the married women's property acts. The first
organized woman's rights movement offered a much
more systematic critique of women's legal status in marriage. Indeed, feminists repeatedly identified a woman's
right to control the terms of marital intercourse as the
predicate condition for women's equality, without which
full property rights and even suffrage would be meaningless. Nevertheless, the law's treatment of marital rape
hardly changed over the course of the nineteenth century, and the modest reform that did occur was limited
to divorce law. The history of women's legal status in
the nineteenth century did not follow just one path, of
gradual progress and consistent success. Lawmakers
willing to enact the married women's property acts or to
ratify the Nineteenth Amendment apparently thought
there was too much at stake in changing the marital
rape exemption. The exemption's survival into the
modem era is not evidence that the rule was never contested. The rule was maintained despite decades of feminist objection, because the exemption's defenders were
far more powerful than its critics.

2. The Law of Mariage in the Nineteenth Centuiy
To appreciate what the defenders of the marital
rape exemption understood to be at issue requires a brief
introduction to the law of marriage in the nineteenth
century. The frequent identification of the married
women's property acts as the culmination of the feminist
campaign for the legal reform of marriage might suggest-wrongly-that the law of marriage was somehow
equalized in the middle of the nineteenth century. That
was hardly the case. The marital rape exemption was
explained and defended amidst an elaborate legal regime
that continued to explicitly subordinate wives to husbands.

9

In the nineteenth century, authoritative legal
sources agreed that the rights and obligations of husbands and wives were most appropriately understood,
explained, and regulated through the organizing rubric of
a status/contract distinction. This distinction classified
legal rules into two oppositional categories: status rules
(like the marital rape exemption), which fixed marital
rights and obligations in the law and made them unalterable by private agreement, and contract rules, which permitted husbands and wives, or couples contemplating
marriage, to structure their own legal relationship if they
preferred not to rely on the default rules set by the state.
The marital relation was governed by both types of rules,
mainly at alternate parts of its life cycle.
By the first half of the nineteenth century, individuals had a large measure of control over decisions about
whether, when, how, and whom to marry....
Status rules were much more consequential and
prominent in controlling ongoing marital relationships.
A couple could choose whether to marry, but could
rarely modify the legal nature of their union....
This structural account of status in the nineteenthcentury marital relation only provides a partial picture,
however. The rights and obligations of husband and
wife also depended enormously, of course, on the substance of these status rules. In the nineteenth century,
many of these rules operated along common law principles of coverture, which explicitly subordinated wives to
husbands. William Blackstone, whose treatise on the
laws of England was extremely influential throughout
the United States, offered the classic definition. "By
marriage," he wrote,
the husband and wife are one person in law:
that is, the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband: under whose wing, protection,
and cover, she performs every thing.. . . Upon
this principle, of a union of person in husband
and wife, depend almost all the legal rights,
10

duties, and disabilities, that either of them
acquire by the marriage.
Coverture united husband and wife by subsuming a married woman's civil identity and according husbands wideranging control over their wives. Legal scholars
explained the principle in the language of hierarchical
authority and obedience. As James Schouler's family law
treatise elaborated, "the laws of nature and divine revelation" jointly designated the husband as "the head of the
family." "It [was] for the wife to love, honor, and obey: it
[was] for the husband to love, cherish, and protect."
The marital rape exemption had deep roots in this
legal regime. It was understood, explained, and defended
in the context of a wide array of marital status rules that
conclusively inferred consent from a person's initial
agreement to marry and coverture principles that organized marital status so that husbands exercised control
over their wives.

B. The Marital Rape Exemption in NineteenthCentury Criminal Law
There was not the slightest suggestion in nineteenth-century case law and treatises that a husband
could be prosecuted for raping his wife. Rape laws stated
what a 'male person"' could not do to 'any woman,
other than his wife."' Legal writers took pains to emphasize that "[a] man cannot be guilty of a rape upon his
own wife," that "a husband does not become guilty of
rape by forcing his wife to his own embraces," that rape
"may be committed by any male of the age of fourteen or
over, not the husband of the female." This clear prohibition on prosecution had its intended effect. I have been
able to locate no nineteenth-century attempts to try a
husband for personally raping his wife, and only one
prosecution, Frazier v. State, from early in the twentieth
century. The Texas court that heard Mr. Frazier's appeal
in 1905 reversed his conviction for assault with attempt
to rape, which is not surprising. The unexplained-and
unique-puzzle of the Frazier case is how it reached a
trial court and a jury in the first place.
11

The reasons cited to explain and justify the
exemption in nineteenth-century authoritative legal
sources originated in the work of Sir Matthew Hale, a
former Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench in
England. Hale's seminal treatise, the History of the Pleas
of the Crown, was first published in England in 1736 and
became extraordinarily influential in American legal circles almost immediately thereafter. Even more than a
century after Hale's work appeared, American treatises
and case law had not supplemented Hale's arguments for
the marital rape exemption with alternate theories of
their own.
These sources depended on Hale so heavily
because his arguments, grounded in principles of marital
status law and common law coverture, still seemed so
convincing to them. In the nineteenth century,
American judges and lawyers who confronted the marital rape exemption routinely cited Hale's argument from
irretractible consent. Hale's explication read, in full, as
follows: "But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which
she cannot retract." The statement included no supporting citations, and this appears not to have been an oversight. Even scholars who believe that ample common
law authority already sanctioned the marital rape
exemption when Hale wrote, posit that the theory of
irretractible consent originated with him. Yet treatises
and cases would repeat Hale's words, virtually verbatim,
throughout the nineteenth century, often as the only
explanation they offered for the exemption: "A man

cannot be guilty of a rape upon his own wife; for the
matrimonial consent cannot be retracted," they noted.
"[Tihe husband of a woman cannot himself be guilty of
an actual rape upon his wife, on account of the matrimonial consent which she has given, and which she cannot
retract." Several aspects of Hale's theory suggest why it
proved so compelling.
12

Hale's understanding of presumed legal consent
made enormous sense in the framework of nineteenthcentury marital status law. As we have seen, all of these
status rules operated automatically, subjecting every husband and every wife to predetermined constraints without permitting individual negotiation or waiting for individual consent. These status rules, moreover, remained
in place as long as the marital relation itself: Opting-out
was impossible while one's marriage lasted (and the
prospects for securing a divorce were very limited).
Whether a husband or wife actually supported these
rules, or would have liked to contract around them, was
irrelevant as a matter of law. The only occasion for
actual agreement was a person's decision to marry in the
first place. Hale's theory applied this same understanding of legal consent to one of the many status rules that
organized the marital relation at common law, namely,
the rape exemption. His work explained that, in this
context as elsewhere, a married person's original agreement to marry justified a legal presumption of permanent
and irretractible consent to marital status law.
Hale's argument for the marital rape exemption
also resonated deeply with the coverture principles that
shaped the content of most marital status rules in the
nineteenth century. His explanation started by noting
the "mutual matrimonial consent and contract" of husband and wife, evidenced by their shared agreement to
marry. But it proceeded to outline only the obligation
that a wife owed her husband: "for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself
in this kind unto her husband." In other words, Hale presented a couple's mutual decision to marry as grounds for
subjecting wives and husbands to very different obligations and rights. Both a wife and her husband agreed to
marry, but where this agreement gave the husband a
right of sexual access to his wife, it bestowed an obligation on the wife to submit. One might think, as a purely
theoretical matter, that this explicit sex-based differentiation required justification. But in historical context, of
course, such an explanation could easily be understood
13

as superfluous. Hale's theory accorded with coverture
principles that generally subjected wives to a wide array
of limitations and obligations that husbands did not bear.
This is not to say that the relationship between husband
and wife was not a reciprocal one at common law. It
was; a wife had the right to support and protection from
her husband. But while the marital relationship was reciprocal, it was also explicitly hierarchical. Wives were
vastly more constrained; they surrendered many more
legal rights by marrying. The marital rape exemption,
with its unequal demands on husband and wife, was just
one more example of coverture principles at work. And
the widespread commitment to the operative tenets of
coverture was another reason that Hale's irretractible
consent theory struck authoritative legal sources in the
nineteenth century as so satisfactory.
Authoritative legal sources in the nineteenth century agreed that a husband could not, and should not, be
prosecuted for raping his wife. Their explanations,
grounded in principles and presumptions evident
throughout nineteenth-century regulation of the marital
relation and sexuality, explicitly presumed and supported
the legal subordination of wives to husbands. Judges,
lawyers, and legislators may have been willing to oversee
some modification of other aspects of women's legal status at common law in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, but they remained emphatically unwilling to
tamper with a husband's marital rape exemption.
Yet this is hardly the full story of the marital rape
exemption in the nineteenth century. Authoritative
legal sources unambiguously endorsed the exemption,
and the popular understanding of a man's marital rights
seems to have tracked the legal rule. This does not
mean, however, that a husband's conjugal prerogatives
went uncontested in the nineteenth century. As Part II
recounts, the nineteenth-century woman's rights movement fought against a husband's right to control marital
intercourse in a campaign that was remarkably developed, prolific, and insistent, given nineteenth-century
14

taboos against the public mention of sex or sexuality.
Leading feminists identified a husband's conjugal rights
as the crucial constitutive element of women's subordination. They called for both an enforceable right to
refuse a husband's sexual demands and realistic socioeconomic alternatives to submission. The record of this
struggle dramatically expands our understanding of the
history of marital rape, and also provides important new
insights into the goals, progress, and efficacy of the first
organized woman's rights movement, which historians
now frequently describe as overwhelmingly dominated
by the battle for suffrage.
At the level of prescriptive norms about marital
behavior, discussed in Part III, the organized feminist
critique had genuine resonance, but ultimately not
transformative power. The advocates of "free love," who
operated on the leftward fringe of organized feminism in
the nineteenth century, articulated the arguments of the
woman's rights movement in a more radical voice.
More surprisingly, popular tracts on marriage, reproduction, and health agreed that the exemption's consequences should be curbed in actual practice. Very soon
after the organized woman's rights movement mobilized
against a husband's conjugal rights, these mainstream
authors began to describe and denounce the harm that
marital rape inflicted on wives. This prescriptive literature, though, did not contest a husband's legal right to
determine the terms of marital intercourse. Instead, it
called on husbands to voluntarily refrain from exercising
their legal prerogatives, on the ground that such
restraint would benefit them as much as their wives.
Where feminists demanded a structure of rights to free
women from subordination in marriage, the prescriptive
literature turned the concern over marital rape into a
call for voluntary strategies to enhance marital happiness and harmony, to be pursued to the extent that they
served a husband's interests.
In the end, as Part IV explains, the nineteenthcentury feminists lived to see no legal reform of a husband's conjugal prerogatives beyond marginal adjustments in the terms on which divorce was available.
15

The marital rape exemption outlasted the rise of the first
organized woman's rights movement in the United
States, the enactment of the first married women's property acts, and the ratification of woman suffrage, but not
because the issue was uncontroversial or unspeakable. In
this realm where sex and reproduction were so clearly at
issue, authoritative legal sources, like mainstream prescriptive authors, were unwilling to translate the growing
social recognition that marital rape inflicted severe harm
on wives into a legal acknowledgment of the dangers
potentially posed by the marital relation, through the
granting of legal rights that women might enforce
against their husbands.
11. THE FIRST ORGANIZED FEMINIST CAMPAIGN
AGAINST A HUSBAND'S CONJUGAL RIGHTS

Almost immediately after the Seneca Falls
Convention in 1848 sparked the formation of the first
organized woman's rights movement in the United
States, feminists began to argue that full political and
economic rights, including even the vote, would not be
nearly sufficient to establish women's equality with men.
Although the woman's rights movement was committed
to each of these reforms, feminists simultaneously contended that all of them would ultimately prove hollow
unless a married woman also had the right to regulate
her husband's sexual access-the right to her own person, in the language of the nineteenth century.
Nineteenth-century Americans were reluctant to speak
openly about sex, and the leaders of organized feminism
were well aware of the social sanctions for sexual frankness. But their commitment to establishing a woman's
right of self-possession as the foundation of her equality
led feminists to offer a systematic and thorough critique
of marital rape in language wholly understandable to
contemporary audiences.
The consensual account of the history of marital
rape now accepted by the exemption's supporters and
critics alike is simply wrong as a factual matter. The
nineteenth-century woman's rights movement contested
a husband's right to determine the terms of marital inter16

course vociferously and profoundly. Indeed, this campaign constitutes an important chapter in the history of
organized feminism in the nineteenth century, one that
sheds new light on the nature and dimensions of that
movement.
Many historians have described the leadership of
the nineteenth-century woman's rights movement as
classically liberal, meaning intent on securing a genderneutral distribution of political and economic rights and
uninterested in transforming the structure of familial
relations. On this account, the first organized feminist
movement sought to apply the principles of the
Declaration of Independence to women, without challenging any of the document's other premises.
Specifically, these historians contend that feminists
grounded their appeal for gender-neutral rights of access
to the public sphere in a natural rights argument that
stressed "that women were essentially human and only
incidentally female" and regarded any mention of
women's particular position, especially in the family, "as
suspect." All men and women were created equal, and
the appropriate way to recognize their equality was by
distributing political liberty, namely the right to vote for
democratically-elected representatives. This historical
interpretation of the woman's rights movement is
grounded in a reading of women's demands for suffrage.
But historians have extrapolated from the debate over
suffrage to conclude that the nineteenth-century feminist
movement was not alert to sources of inequality within
the family that affected women's power and resources as a
class or committed to gender-specific structural reform.
Even where these historians briefly allude to the feminist
claim for self-ownership in marriage, they do not indicate
that this discussion might challenge their understanding
of the movement. Nineteenth-century feminists certainly did rely on arguments grounded in classic liberalism,
which was the dominant philosophical tradition of the
era and well suited to the suffrage demand. Indeed, the
Declaration of Sentiments adopted at Seneca Falls was
explicitly modeled on the Declaration of Independence.
Yet, as the feminist argument for a wife's right to control
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her own person makes clear, the notion that the woman's
rights movement limited itself to applying established
liberal principles to women vastly understates the scope
of the movement's theoretical commitments. These feminists began with liberalism's dedication to freedom and
autonomy, but took it in radically new directions.
In defining what the right to one's own person
meant, articulate feminists did not focus on gender-neutral rights to the public sphere or freedom from coercion
by the state. They were concerned about married
women who submitted to their husbands' sexual
demands as the result of force, or threats, or because they
lacked palatable alternatives. The woman's rights movement sought to establish a wife's right of refusal and to
remake women's social and economic possibilities to create realistic alternatives to marriage. In making this
claim, feminists recognized that some of the most important barriers to female self-possession were located within the structure of marriage, as well as the behavior of
individual husbands. Feminists criticized both a husband's legal right of sexual access and the coverture rules
that stripped married women of control over their family's resources. They also objected to the tenuous circumstances under which many never-married, separated, and
divorced women lived, subject to both explicit employment discrimination that left women with few ways to
support themselves outside of marriage and the social
stigma associated with living outside a husband's household. Indeed, feminists called unwanted marital intercourse, where the wife had acquiesced because of her
economic and social dependence on her husband, legalized prostitution. By that, they meant that the wife who
was structurally compelled to have sex when she did not
desire the act or its reproductive consequences was different only in name from the woman without any available option but to sell her body to strange men on the
street. In this vision, women's economic, legal, and bodily vulnerability in marriage were all intricately connected. In demanding a woman's right to her own person,
feminists fought all of these inequalities simultaneously.
This claim, moreover, was intensely gender-specif18

ic. Feminists campaigning against marital rape focused
solely on a woman's right to control marital intercourse,
and they did not articulate their demand as a call for
women to receive the same protections that men
enjoyed. Their argument for self-ownership was not
based on a theory of bodily inviolateness that would
apply to man and woman like. Rather, it looked to
women's exclusive responsibility for raising children.
Nineteenth-century feminists did not celebrate the norm
assigning women all of the work of childcare.
Nonetheless, they took it to be such a profound social
expectation that they reasoned within it, contending
that women needed to have control over marital intercourse so that they could regulate the amount of their
lives they devoted to motherhood. In demanding a
woman's right to her own person, thenineteenth-century feminist movement was asserting an equal right, and
challenging gender-based subordination, in a completely
gender-specific way. This is not to suggest that the
woman's rights movement would have countenanced
sexual violence against men. But organized feminism
explained the right to self-ownership in an idiom radically different from that employed by the nation's
founders: one that was grounded in a gender-specific
understanding of the comparative social position of
women and men.
A. A Wife's Right to Her Person as the Predicate

for Women's Equality
The feminist critique of women's legal subordination quickly focused on a married woman's lack of control over her own person. This concern, moreover, was
evident throughout the woman's rights movement; feminists' substantive views on the issue differed far less than
their strategic appraisals about how it could best be pursued. The most useful starting point for understanding
what organized feminism took to be at stake in demanding a wife's right to her person lies in the work of
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the most prominent and brilliant theorist of the movement.
As early as 1852, Stanton argued that marital
intercourse was inappropriate under certain conditions.
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Addressing a temperance convention, she warned of the
dire eugenic consequences of having children with an
alcoholic husband and informed the wives of such men
that they should cease sexual relations at once. "[Llive
with him as a friend," Stanton advised, "watch over and
pray for him as a mother would for an erring son, soothe
him in his wretchedness, comfort and support him, as
best [you] may-but for woman's sake, for humanity's
sake, be not his wife-bring no children to that blighted,
dreary, desolate hearth." This exhortation, of course, left
the key question ambiguous: How exactly was a wife to
carry out her responsibility when her husband insisted
on sexual access? Did Stanton expect a wife to rely solely on moral suasion? If so, what if persuasion did not
work? Indeed, one might read this statement as placing
married women in a double bind, wherein they would be
held morally responsible for reproduction that they did
not, in fact or in law, have the ability to control.
Stanton's early ambiguity was deliberate. As she
explained in a letter to Susan B. Anthony, her closest
ally, Stanton had grave doubts about "whether the world
[was] quite willing or ready to discuss the question of
marriage." But Stanton's commitment to securing a
married woman's right to her own person was clear.
Indeed, in the same letter, she identified the issue as the
pivotal site of women's subordination:
It is in vain to look for the elevation of woman
so long as she is degraded in marriage.... Man
in his lust has regulated long enough this
whole question of sexual intercourse. Now let
the mother of mankind, whose prerogative it is
to set bounds to his indulgence, rouse up and
give this whole matter a thorough, fearless
examination.

. .

. I feel, as never before, that

this whole question of woman's rights turns on
the pivot of the marriage relation, and, mark
my word, sooner or later it will be the topic for
discussion. I would not hurry it on, nor would
I avoid it.
In 1855, Stanton found the appropriate occasion
20

for public frankness. That year, her cousin, Gerrit
Smith, a leading antislavery reformer who was sympathetic to feminism, wrote her a public letter about the
woman's rights movement. In this letter, he argued that
women's continued inequality was largely the result of
their dress, which was admittedly constraining and
impractical. Stanton, in a forceful and public reply,
explained women's inequality as rooted in their lack of
control over their person. She identified this right as the
most important that women hoped to achieve, more significant than any of the rights for which women had
been publicly agitating since 1848. Indeed, Stanton
articulated a view of woman's citizenship that began,
locationally, with the body. She understood a woman's
right to control her person as the foundational right
upon which political and economic equality needed to
rest if they were to have any value. Yet when Stanton
considered what was at stake in having control over
one's person, she did not speak in terms of physical transgression, condemning the bodily invasion of unwanted
intercourse or unwanted gestation. Instead, she focused
on the social work of reproduction, the work of raising
children. Stanton recognized that this work fell exclusively to women, and her demand for self-possession
spoke only to women's claims. Stanton's argument about
the right of self-ownership was, more accurately, an
intensely gender-specific argument about a woman's particular right. She contended that women needed to
have full control over marital intercourse so that they
could determine how many children they would raise
and when. As Stanton explained:
The rights, to vote, to hold property, to speak
in public, are all-important; but there are
great social rights, before which all others sink
into utter insignificance. The cause of woman
is ... . not a question of meats and drinks, of
money and lands, but of human rights-the
sacred right of a woman to her own person, to
all her God-given powers of body and soul.
Did it ever enter into the mind of man that
woman too had an inalienable right to life,
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liberty, and the pursuit of her individual happiness? Did he ever take in the idea that to
the mother of the race, and to her alone,
belonged the right to say when a new being
should be brought into the world? Has he, in
the gratification of his blind passions, ever
paused to think whether it was with joy and
gladness that she gave up ten or twenty years
of the heyday of her existence to all the cares
and sufferings of excessive maternity? Our
present laws, our religious teachings, our
social customs on the whole question of marriage and divorce, are most degrading to
woman . . .. Here, in my opinion, is the start-

ing-point; here is the battleground where our
independence must be fought and won.
Stanton's argument for a woman's right to her person, first fully developed in public in 1855, remained her
pressing concern for years. She consistently pursued the
issue, with more or less explicitness, although she was
well aware that a demand to restructure the most intimate relations of marriage would be extremely controversial. A year after Stanton's reply to Smith, Lucy
Stone, another leader of the woman's rights movement,
wrote Stanton privately, asking her to speak out again on
"a wife's right to her own body" at an upcoming National
Woman's Rights Convention, notwithstanding "the censure which a discussion of this question [would] bring."
Stanton agreed to write to the convention, although her
public letter was less direct than Stone's private correspondence. Rather than offer a complete account of the
claim for control over one's person, Stanton effectively
referenced and invoked her earlier argument. "Is it any
wonder," she asked, "that woman regards herself as a
mere machine, a tool for men's pleasure? Verily is she a
hopeless victim of his morbidly developed passions." In
the feminist reordering, woman would be "the rightful
lawgiver in all our most sacred relations." Women reading this letter would have had no difficulty understanding its intent. In the years to follow, Stanton spoke
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about a married woman's right "to her person" again and
again. She remained convinced that a wife's right to
refuse her husband's sexual demands was the bedrock
foundation needed to support equality. "Woman's degradation is in man's idea of his sexual rights," Stanton
wrote to Anthony. "How this marriage question grows
on me. It lies at the very foundation of all progress."
B. StructuralConsent and Marriageas Legalized

Prostitution
Nineteenth-century feminists often spoke of a
woman's right to her person by explaining that, without
this right, economic and political equality would be
meaningless. The statements reflected their view that
equal citizenship needed to be grounded in self-ownership, because a wife's right to control her husband's sexual access would enable her to determine the conditions
under which she performed reproductive labor. Yet this
point constitutes only part of the feminist claim, and
overstates the distinction that these women drew
between personal self-possession, and political and economic rights. When feminists elaborated their understanding of consent, they made clear that they would
not be satisfied with legal reform recognizing a wife's
right to herself. Instead, they argued that a wife could
only freely consent to marital intercourse under circumstances in which she had both the legal right to refuse
and realistic alternatives to submission. This was a
structural understanding of consent that considered how
the structure of the marital relation, rather than simply
the behavior of individual husbands, shaped women's
opportunities as a class. Feminists noted, and attacked,
the tremendous legal, social, and economic pressures
that pushed women to marry and kept them there. A
woman who lived outside a husband's household, or
worse yet divorced or separated, was marginalized and
often found it extremely difficult to support herself,
given laws and practices that explicitly excluded women
from most jobs and suppressed the wages for women's
work. In marriage, coverture principles stripped a wife of
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almost all legal claims to her household's resources and
power, leaving her to confront her husband as an economic, social, and political dependent.
The language of "legalized prostitution" became
one of the most powerful idioms in which nineteenthcentury feminists articulated this structural understanding of consent. Even before the organization of the first
woman's rights movement, Hale and his successors had
anxiously recognized the similarities between the situation of wives subjected to the marital rape exemption
and prostitutes. . .. [Tihese lawyers and judges were
never willing, or able, to present a substantive explanation differentiating the work of prostitution from the
sexual services that husbands were entitled to take from
their financially dependent wives. Instead, the authoritative legal sources sought to distinguish the two classes
of women in jurisdictional terms. They argued that only
extramarital intercourse could constitute prostitution,
that sex could only be illicit and degrading if a woman's
sexual partner was not her husband. The woman's rights
movement emphatically rejected that notion and was
convinced that it had spotted a crucial weakness in the
defense of a husband's conjugal rights. Precisely countering the claims of the exemption's supporters, feminists
employed the term legalized prostitution to describe the
condition of wives who acquiesced to marital intercourse
because they had no practical alternative, nowhere else
to go and no other means of negotiating their marital
relationship. They argued that the legitimacy of sexual
intercourse depended on a woman's genuine consent
(understood structurally), contending that there was little relevant difference between married women who
effectively traded sexual access in return for their husbands' socio-economic support, and prostitutes who
explicitly sold their sexuality to strangers because they,
too, did not have a better way to earn a living. Legal
and illegal prostitution were mirrored phenomena in the
feminist vision, understandable on the same terms.

24

III.

ALTERNATE ITERATIONS OF THE NINETEENTHCENTURY CRITIQUE OF MARITAL RAPE

Criticism of marital rape in the nineteenth century was not limited to the members of the organized
woman's rights movement. Accounts of the harm that
marital rape inflicted on wives appeared in other iterations, both on the fringes of feminism and, more remarkably, in the popular prescriptive literature on marriage,
health, and reproduction. The nature and direction of
the causal links between these social conversations is, to
be sure, difficult to trace precisely. Most likely, the causation was circular, so that the organized feminist campaign was facilitated by growing opposition to marital
rape outside the movement, at the same time that the
efforts of organized feminism helped foster and give
momentum to this wider opposition. What is striking,
though, is that there was a near simultaneous broaching
of the question of marital rape in a number of different
social communities in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, suggesting that the woman's rights discourse
about a supposedly unspeakable subject was far more
centrist and in dialogue with customary norms than one
might have otherwise assumed.
One site of opposition to marital rape outside of
the organized woman's rights movement in the nineteenth century centered on the advocates of what was
then known as "free love." These figures, less the constituents of a cohesive movement than a series of loosely
affiliated individual thinkers, occupied the left-most part
of nineteenth-century feminism, although at the margins
there was some overlap in membership with the woman's
rights movement. The free lovers agreed with the essential elements of the organized feminist argument for a
woman's right to her own person. But they articulated
their critique of the current structure of marital relations
more radically and expansively, and called for even more
transformative change than the woman's rights movement envisioned. Many members of the woman's rights
movement resented the controversial free lovers and
labored to disassociate themselves from free love in the
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popular mind. Yet it is hardly clear that the advocates of
free love hampered the woman's rights movement's campaign against marital rape. The work of the free lovers
added to the reasoning underlying the organized feminist
attack on a husband's conjugal prerogatives. And the
free lovers' deliberately provocative style may have made
the woman's rights movement appear less radical by
comparison.
More importantly perhaps, the popular prescriptive literature contains powerful evidence that the feminist campaign against marital rape resonated with changing social norms about good marital behavior. Dozens of
mainstream prescriptive writers began to publish extensive discussions of the moral, physiological, and eugenic
harm caused by marital rape almost immediately after
the organized feminist movement began to address the
issue. This literature, however, did not contest a husband's legal right to determine the terms of marital intercourse. Rather, it sought to convince husbands to voluntarily refrain from exercising their acknowledged legal
prerogatives, assuring them that the accommodation
would benefit men as much as their wives. Feminists
insisted on a wife's right to control her own person, to be
pursued in the interest of ending women's marital subordination. The prescriptive literature certainly helped
disseminate societal recognition of the proposition that
marital rape inflicted injury on women. But that literature's version of the claim recommended only noncompulsory strategies for marital health, happiness, and harmony, to be pursued at a husband's discretion so long as
they furthered his self-interest.

A. The Advocates of Free Love
B. The PopularPrescriptive Literature
The prescriptive literature on marriage in the second half of the nineteenth century was preoccupied with
warning husbands to refrain from marital intercourse
when they did not have their wives' consent. Popular
authors, like the woman's rights reformers, were remark26

ably frank, even verbose, in their discussion of the issue.
Marriage manuals, written by both men and women and
widely read, warned husbands that subjecting one's wife
to marital intercourse when she did not want to risk the
possibility of motherhood was immoral and dangerous to
the health of man, woman, and unwillingly produced
child. They called on husbands not to exercise their
legal prerogatives and proposed a wide array of stratagems to facilitate that result. In this way, criticism of
marital rape registered and reverberated in a wider popular conversation about intimacy in marriage in the nineteenth century.
It is important to recognize, however, the differences between the feminist rights discourse on marital
rape and the work of mainstream prescriptive writers.
First, the popular prescriptive literature focused on each
individual husband's behavior. These texts wanted husbands to refrain from nonphysical coercion, as well as
physical force compelling a wife to submit to marital
intercourse. But their understanding of a wife's consent
did not include the structural concerns about marriage
that occupied feminists; these writers did not suggest an
inquiry into the limited economic and social opportunities that pushed women into marriage and kept them
there.
More fundamentally, the operative premise behind
the popular prescriptive literature's argument for a husband's voluntary restraint was that he had the authority
to act differently. This literature explicitly addressed
social norms, rather than the law. Yet the two were
never fully separable. The law shaped the prescriptiveliterature's understanding of society, even as that literature urged husbands to act better in practice than the
law required. The prescriptive literature's entire discussion of manly self-restraint assumed and accepted the
baseline proposition that a husband had the right to control the terms of marital intercourse. He might be persuaded not to avail himself of that entitlement, by tracts
promising that marital mutuality would benefit a husband at least as much as his wife. But prescriptive writers acknowledged that the choice was ultimately his.
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This was the very proposition that the woman's rights
activists vigorously disputed. Nineteenth-century feminists explained a husband's conjugal prerogatives as an
instrument of women's subordination and demanded
rights that women could enforce against their husbands.
In the prescriptive literature, this rights discourse was
transformed into suggested strategies for marital health,
happiness, and harmony, to be pursued in a husband's
interest and at his discretion.

1. The PrescriptiveAccount of the Harm of
MaritalRape
Like the nineteenth-century feminists, prescriptive
writers elaborated at length on the harm that marital
rape inflicted. But the prescriptive literature's focus was
not on wives alone. This literature warned that marital
rape inflicted severe injuries on wives that were morally
untenable. It went on, however, to report that marital
rape ultimately operated against a husband's self-interest
as well, appealing directly to the party who retained the
right of control.
Prescriptive writers put forth three prominent
moral arguments explaining the harm that marital rape
caused wives. These arguments were not feminist in
their reasoning; they did not consistently recognize the
fundamental equality of men and women. But they were
real and empathetic nonetheless....
The prescriptive literature supplemented these
moral claims against marital rape with a series of physiological arguments that made clear that the injury caused
by marital rape was not limited to wives. This literature
warned that the practice of marital rape actually endangered the health of its male perpetrator. It also indicated
that the physiological injury that marital rape inflicted
on women and the children they unwillingly bore
inevitably redounded to men's material, emotional, and
dynastic detriment as husbands and fathers.
Nineteenth-century feminists, demanding a woman's
enforceable right to her own person, focused on the
injury that marital rape caused women. Prescriptive
writers, hoping to appeal to the self-interest of husbands,
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explained the physiology of marital rape in much more
male-centered terms than those feminists employed,
using their own health claims to establish their own
(male-centered) case for voluntary restraint.
In contending that husbands put their own health
at risk when they subjected their unwilling wives to marital intercourse, prescriptive writers built on a widespread
understanding that a man could endanger his prospects
by expending sexual energy. Many articulate Americans
in the nineteenth century envisioned the male body as a
closed energy system and sexual activity as a taxing
drain, so that the outlay of sexual effort would leave a
man physically weakened and with less vigor to devote
to intellectual, economic, and moral pursuits. This presupposition was endorsed by leading medical professionals, popular guides to men's health, and even some of the
utopian experimental communities of the day, which
taught their male followers to avoid sexual climax.
The prescriptive literature on marriage contained
analogous warnings about the still more severe physiological consequences for men who had marital intercourse without their wives' consent. Dr. Cowan issued
one of the most complete accounts of the potential dangers. "[l]f the husband demands his rights from the wife,
who only accedes through dread of consequences," he
warned, "the effect on the man's brain and nervous system is very little different from that produced by selfabuse." Indeed, Cowan elaborated a progression of
symptoms with starkly debilitative consequences: "a general weakness of the nervous system;" the "inability to
promptly digest ordinary food;" "a weakening of the
joints, and especially the joints of the knees, a softening
of the muscles, a want of strength, and a motion of an
unsteady, dragging nature, differing so noticeably from
the springing, strong, elastic carriage of the continent
individual;" "dyspepsia;" "general debility;" "consumption;" "weakened and impaired" memory; "disordered
vision;" "impaired" hearing; and "[plaralysis of the lower
extremities.". . .
The prescriptive literature also described the
marital disfunction, financial strain, and household
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disorder that would come to pass if wives were physiologically damaged by unwanted marital intercourse,
explaining women's welfare in terms of their husband's
self-interest....
The physiological dangers confronting the children
that these wives unwillingly conceived were hardly less
severe. In this context too, the prescriptive literature
advised husbands that they would ultimately bear the
cost of the injury they inflicted through marital rape, in
this case through a diminution in the quality of their offspring....
2. Manly Self-Restraint and Self-Interest
The marriage manuals and health guides of the
second half of the nineteenth century offered an extensive account of the injury that marital rape inflicted, on
husbands along with their wives and children. But this
literature did not proceed to advocate legal reform.
Unlike the nineteenth-century feminist movement, it
accepted a husband's right to determine the terms of sex
in marriage. The prescriptive literature described the
harm that marital rape caused in order to set the stage
for the presentation of a variety of strategies designed to
encourage husbands to refrain voluntarily from exercising their admitted legal prerogatives. Having recognized
a husband's sexual entitlement, these strategies appealed
to a man's self-interest explicitly and without apology.
Prescriptive writers acknowledged that a husband's conjugal restraint would benefit his wife, but hastened to
reassure their male readers that voluntarily ceding control over marital intercourse would always strengthen
and solidify a husband's power and position in his family.
Their arguments for voluntary restraint were directed at
a man's self-esteem and his property interest in his wife's
welfare. Storer, the leader of the anti-abortion movement, offered the quintessential explanation for his recommendation that husbands no longer subject their
wives to unwanted intercourse, characterizing a wife's
improved health and longevity solely as an aspect of her
husband's well-being:
And here let me say, that I intend taking no
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ultra ground; that I am neither a fanatic nor
professed philanthrope; and that in loosing, as I
hope to do, some of woman's present chains, it
is solely for professional purposes, to increase
her health, prolong her life, extend the benefits
she confers upon society-in a word, selfishly
to enhance her value to ourselves.
Much of the prescriptive literature evoked similar
themes, albeit in somewhat less blatant and extreme
form.
A number of writers proposed that a husband think
of voluntarily ceding control over intercourse to his wife
as the best possible manifestation of manliness, a way to
confirm and display his noble character. This was a particularly powerful approach because it connected to an
enormous body of existing sentiment which insisted that
the key characteristic of successful masculinity was selfrestraint in the face of strong temptation.... In the latter half of the nineteenth century, prescriptive writers
brought the weight of this understanding of masculinity
to bear on the question of forced sex in marriage. Boyd
emphasized that "it is for woman to determine when
(and when only) the closest relations may be assumed,"
by reminding husbands that "filt is the part of a true man
to renderinstinct and desire wholly subject to reason and conscience." Indeed, he compared a husband's sexual desire
to a formidable racehorse that needed to be broken by
masculine human will. "If a mettlesome young bloodhorse becomes your property, do you let him tame you
and drive you?," Boyd asked. If a husband did, "such failure would betray weakness and lack of manhood. Just so
with regard to the amative propensity; you are to get the
upperhand and keep it. Your manliness is shown when
you possess yourself and master passion, not when passion overpowers and possesses you." . ..
Many authors also counseled husbands that ceding
control over marital intercourse was the only way to preserve the enormous personal benefits of marital love,
happiness, and harmony....
On a related note, the prescriptive literature
promised husbands that their voluntary restraint would
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ultimately lead to more pleasurable marital intercourse,
making a husband's self-interest in his wife's welfare
clearer still. Duffey predicted that a husband who continued to court his wife's affection after marriage and
wait for reciprocation, would find "greater delight" in a
"monthly marital conjunction" than a selfish sensualist
could obtain from "daily or semi-weekly excesses." A
husband, she wrote, "will have only himself to blame, if
he is bound all his life to an apathetic, irresponsive wife."
Cowan, a less elegant if more direct writer, surmised that
"nearly all women .

.

. who are used by their husbands

simply as chattels . . . lie passive and motionless." "As to

the possible pleasure to him of such a union," Cowan
suggested that a husband "might as well practice solitary indulgence.". . .
Even outside the woman's rights movement and
the domain of the free lovers, the question of marital rape
was hardly unthinkable or unspeakable in the latter half
of the nineteenth century. The popular prescriptive literature agreed with feminists, publicly and at length, that
marital rape inflicted severe harm. But feminists made a
rights claim putting forth women's interests, as distinct
from and defined against the interests of men. They
wanted a wife to have the legal right and socio-economic
ability to refuse her husband's sexual demands against his
will, recognizing that voluntary concessions were an
unreliable defense against potentially recalcitrant, dangerous, and selfish husbands. The popular prescriptive literature, in contrast, did not situate its opposition to marital rape in an analysis of women's subordination, and did
not support giving women enforceable rights against
men. It left decisive control over marital intercourse in
the husband's hands, to be exercised in his own interest
as he saw fit. Popular prescriptive writers promised that
the interests of husband and wife coincided on the issue
of marital rape (although one could deduce from their
descriptions of contemporaneous marital relations that
many husbands had been slow to recognize that fact).
The prescriptive account of the injury that marital rape
produced focused as much attention on the costs to husbands as wives. Yet it was clear which party to the mar32

riage would prevail when marital mutuality broke down.

IV.

CIRCUMSCRIBED LEGAL REFORM IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE LAW OF DIVORCE

In the end, authoritative legal sources in the latter
half of the nineteenth century refused to alter the law's
treatment of marital rape, with the exception of marginal changes in the terms on which divorce was available.
The fate of the feminist campaign for a woman's right to
her own person reveals a deep reluctance to tamper with
a husband's conjugal prerogatives, in an era when lawmakers were willing to ameliorate the property rights of
married women and, eventually, to ratify woman suffrage. Social recognition of the proposition that marital
rape inflicted severe harm on women was widely disseminated. But in this context where marital intercourse and
reproduction were so manifestly at stake, legal authorities-like popular prescriptive writers-were strongly
disinclined to incorporate into the law a recognition of
marriage as a possible site of antagonism and danger, in
which women might need and merit enforceable legal
rights protecting them from their husbands.
Authoritative legal sources considering marital
rape in the last decades of the nineteenth century were
only willing to make limited adjustments at the peripheries of the divorce regime. Over time, in some jurisdictions and in some extreme circumstances, it became easier for a (privileged) woman to secure a divorce based on
her husband's unwanted sexual demands, or to prevent
her husband from divorcing her because she refused marital intercourse. These changes took feminists' concerns
into account, but in a severely modified form.

A. A Husband's Unwanted Sexual Demands as
Legal Cruelty
The first site of change in the law's treatment of
marital rape in the nineteenth century revolved around
the question of whether, and when, a husband's unwanted sexual demands might constitute legal cruelty entitling his wife to divorce. This was a significant issue
because divorce in the nineteenth century was available
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only for cause and the recognized grounds of fault were
highly limited, the most important being adultery, desertion, and cruelty. In the first half of the nineteenth century, courts were almost completely silent on the question of whether marital rape could ever be cruelty. The
one notable case on the subject during this period, Shaw
v. Shaw, suggested that wives would encounter extreme
difficulty in establishing the claim.
Emeline Shaw's petition for a divorce on the
ground of intolerable cruelty reached the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors in 1845. Mrs. Shaw needed to
avoid sexual intercourse for clear and undisputed health
reasons, which the court acknowledged. But her husband, Daniel Shaw, had repeatedly and forcibly compelled her to submit, despite her protests and attempts to
escape. The supreme court of errors agreed with Mrs.
Shaw that involuntary marital intercourse might constitute cruelty in cases where the wife had physiological
grounds for refusal. Yet it denied her a divorce, on the
theory that there was insufficient evidence that her husband had known the state of her health and understood
the consequences of his behavior. Mrs. Shaw, the court
admitted, had told her husband that his sexual demands
endangered her health. But she could not prove, the
court reasoned, that he believed her....
Within less than a decade, however, the Shaw decision was being criticized, even in legal treatises....
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, some
courts found legally cognizable cruelty where a husband
had subjected his wife to excessive sexual demands and
those demands had endangered her health. Allowing
these women to divorce their husbands was, it should be
noted, a liberalization. Indeed, the decisions were part
of a larger liberalization of divorce law in postbellum
America, a period in which the number of divorces
granted to women claiming cruelty escalated dramatically. These successful divorce suits for sexual cruelty
suggest that the critique of marital rape articulated, in
different forms, by feminists and popular prescriptive
writers was influencing social understandings about
appropriate marital behavior, at least in arenas otherwise
34

receptive to change.
But the liberalization was strictly limited. First, the
potential availability of divorce for cruelty did not
change the law governing intact marriages. The legal
possibility of exit may have given some wives more
leverage in negotiating the terms of marital intercourse.
But it did not do more than that to protect wives from
their husbands' sexual demands while the marriage lasted. Husbands retained their prerogatives without the
threat of either criminal sanction or any other legal
intervention. Until divorce, Hale's theory of irretractible consent remained in place.
Second, divorce was not an available or attractive
option for wide segments of the female population in the
nineteenth century. Pursuing a divorce petition for sexual cruelty was expensive and risky. Judicial recognition
of cruelty could be explicitly class-conscious, with poorer
wives expected to endure more. The public exposure
involved in such a divorce suit might also be highly
humiliating. As Dall observed, "women know that the
coarsest woman [would have to] have suffered in no ordinary degree, before she could [be] driven into a public
statement of such grievances." More fundamentally,
many women, even if they could have successfully
weathered a divorce suit, lacked real socio-economic
alternatives to marriage-a point feminist critics made
abundantly clear. Women were likely to be particularly
concerned about the well-being of their children and
their ability to support them. Indeed, the economic vulnerability that most women, and children, experienced
upon divorce led a number of nineteenth-century feminists to actively oppose the liberalization of divorce laws
as a general matter. In addition, many women had profound religious or moral objections to divorce.
Opposition to divorce remained widespread among
American churches in the second half of the nineteenth
century (especially in the absence of adultery). Even
some members of the woman's rights movement argued
that marriage vows represented an unseverable commitment.
Third, the cruelty decisions accepting a husband's
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unwanted sexual behavior as ground for divorce only
recognized harm in a confined category of cases. Under
this case law, a wife could not secure a divorce simply
because her husband had raped her. Marital rape, standing alone, was not a recognized cause for divorce.
Instead, petitioning wives had to demonstrate: (a) that
their husband's unwanted demands were unusual, either
quantitatively excessive or particularly brutal; and (b)
that these demands had jeopardized their health.
The law's treatment of marital rape was not the
product of consensual agreement in the nineteenth century. The vision of marital rape as uncontested terrain
until the last quarter of the twentieth century effaces a
vibrant movement in opposition. Feminists, in the first
organized woman's rights movement and on its left-ward
periphery, demanded a woman's right to control her own
person in marriage, arguing for both an enforceable prerogative to refuse marital intercourse and palatable
socio-economic alternatives to submission. This campaign was intense, public, and remarkably frank. It recognized marriage as a potentially antagonistic or abusive
relation, and strove to provide women with rights and
resources they could utilize independent of their husbands' agreement, to defend themselves from a husband's
unwanted sexual demands.
This was a radical agenda, yet criticism of marital
rape was neither unthinkable or unspeakable in the popular discourse of the latter half of the nineteenth century. Very soon after the woman's rights movement initiated its public battle against marital rape, sustained
accounts of the harm that marital rape inflicted on wives
began to appear in the mainstream prescriptive literature on marriage, reproduction, and health. This literature,
however, did not support legal change. Instead, it urged
husbands to practice voluntary restraint, on the ground
that the concession would benefit them at least as much
as their wives. In the pages of the prescriptive literature,
the feminist rights discourse was recast as a series of suggested strategies for marital harmony, health, and happiness. The popular prescriptive literature promised that
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the interests of husbands and wives were actually and
always aligned on the question of marital rape, but left
final control over a wife's person with her husband, to be
wielded at his discretion.
Ultimately, the law's treatment of marital rape
changed just marginally in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Women never won the right to control
their own persons in marriage that feminists had sought.
Indeed, by century's end, the only legal protection a wife
could muster against an uncooperative husband was the
slender solace provided by tepid liberalization of the
divorce law. Social recognition of the harm and prevalence of marital rape was widely disseminated. Yet
authoritative legal sources-like popular prescriptive
authors-remained unwilling to structure women's legal
rights around the proposition that spousal negotiations
over the terms of marital intercourse might be a site of
divergent interests and danger, where wives needed and
justly deserved the ability to protect themselves from
their husbands.
V. THE MODERN DEBATE OVER THE MARITAL
RAPE ExEMPTION

As the feminist movement increasingly turned its
attention to suffrage in the early twentieth century and
then lost much of its organizational spark after suffrage
was won, debate over marital rape dwindled. The first
sustained contest over marital rape was coterminous with
the life span of the first woman's rights movement in the
United States. Begun almost immediately upon the
organization of nineteenth-century feminism, it dissipated when the movement disbanded. It was not until the
last quarter of the twentieth century that the legal status
of marital rape was again subject to significant attack, led
this time by the second organized women's movement.
Here too, however, the resulting reform has been partial
and uneven.
Divorce is now widely available. Indeed, every
state has enacted some form of no-fault divorce in
recent years, so that the law of cruelty and desertion has
become far less important and developed. But the possi37

bility of divorce, now as in the nineteenth century, does
nothing to alter the law governing intact marriages.
Moreover, many of the practical obstacles to divorce
that women confronted in the nineteenth century
remain in place to a significant extent today. Most
notably, divorce is still economically disastrous for the
average woman, especially if she is raising children.
Reform of the criminal exemption has also been
fragmentary. A majority of states still retain some form
of the rule exempting a husband from prosecution for
raping his wife. This is where modem courts, legislators,
and commentators defending or contesting the legal status of marital rape have focused their attention. The
history of the nineteenth-century campaign against marital rape casts new light on this modem debate over a
husband's conjugal prerogatives and helps explain its
course.
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the
modem defense of the marital rape exemption-apparent when considered in light of the historical contest
over a husband's conjugal prerogatives but generally
unnoticed in contemporary commentary-is that it presupposes the aligned interests of husband and wife. The
two arguments that modem defenders of the exemption
have chosen to stress most prominently are that the law
protects marital privacy and promotes marital harmony
and reconciliation. These claims are slightly different,
but they have a common project, which is to explain
how the exemption advances the shared concerns of
men and women, benefitting both. Indeed, contemporary supporters of the exemption go beyond that contention. Their assumption of conjoined interests in marriage is so absolute that proponents do not concede that
a marital rape exemption might inflict harm on wives.
Their argument assumes that a wife's interests, like her
husband's, are always and wholly served in a marital relationship where her husband cannot be prosecuted for
raping her. In the exemption's modern defense, the
potential harm of marital rape is rendered invisible.
This strategy has been very successful, modem fem38

inist efforts against the exemption notwithstanding....
In part, the consensual account of the history of
marital rape, now accepted by supporters and opponents
of the exemption alike, helps explain the success of the
exemption's modem defenders. The proposition that the
marital rape exemption serves the shared interests of
husbands and wives is likely to appear more reasonable,
even commonsensical, if one approaches the exemption
with the assumption that it has long been the subject of
consensual agreement between men and women. That
proposition would be more difficult to maintain if the
historical contest over marital rape, in which feminists
vociferously opposed a husband's conjugal prerogatives as
the ultimate foundation of women's subordination in
marriage, was widely known. As this Article has
revealed, the marital rape exemption did not survive
into the twentieth century because it lacked opposition
or because no organized cohort of women thought that
the exemption operated to the benefit of husbands but
the great detriment of their wives.
Still, it would be implausible to suggest that the
present legislative commitment to preserving some substantial form of the marital rape exemption, and the
judicial decision to not intercede under the Equal
Protection Clause, would instantly collapse, if the historical struggle over marital rape became common knowledge. If the fate of the nineteenth-century campaign
against a husband's conjugal prerogatives illuminates
anything, it is that society's reluctance to acknowledge
that marriage is a potentially antagonistic and dangerous
relation by giving women legal rights against their husbands is long-standing, well-entrenched, and extremely
resistant to feminist opposition, especially where marital
sex and reproduction are directly implicated. Even the
nineteenth-century prescriptive authors who expounded
at length on the harm that marital rape was inflicting on
wives were unwilling to translate that social recognition
into support for granting women legal entitlements.
Where feminists made a rights claim advancing women's
interests as they were distinct from and defined in opposition to those of men, the prescriptive literature put
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forth a series of suggested strategies for marital harmony
and happiness. Authoritative legal sources, in turn,
absolutely refused to alter a husband's exemption from
prosecution for raping his wife. After a half-century of
writing and advocacy (feminist and otherwise) exploring
sexual abuse in marriage, the only change in the legal
status of marital rape consisted of a marginal amelioration in the terms on which divorce was available to
(privileged) women.
Phrased another way, then, one reason that people
are so attracted to the consensual account of the history
of marital rape in the first place is that we greatly prefer
to envision marital relations as loving, mutually supportive, and harmonious, rather than loathsome, abusive,
and conflict-ridden-even though, as a practical matter,
we necessarily and all the time encounter evidence that
the latter state of affairs characterizes some relationships.
That cultural denial helps explain, for instance, the studies finding that even people who know current divorce
rates, believe that the possibility that they will divorce is
negligible and fail to plan rationally for the contingency.
The contemporary defense of the marital rape exemption is one of the most conspicuous, if bizarre, expressions of this phenomenon. Modem courts, lawmakers,
and commentators never talk more about the wonders of
marital love, trust, intimacy, and respect than when they
champion a husband's freedom from prosecution for raping his wife.
The cultural need to understand marital relations
as consensual and harmonious also helps explain another
phenomenon of approximately the last quarter-century.
During this period, dozens of states revisited their marital
rape exemptions, but decided to retain them in substantial form nonetheless. One result of this review was that
states modified the scope of their exemptions. Another
result was that virtually every one of these states rewrote
its marital rape exemption in gender-neutral terms, in
contrast to the explicit and enthusiastic gender-specificity of the common law formulation. This latter, linguistic
change has almost no practical consequences, given the
accuracy with which one can predict that marital rapes
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will be committed by husbands on wives. But as a matter
of modem equal protection doctrine, it is very important.
Statutes that explicitly classify by sex are automatically subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, which relatively few statutes have
managed to survive. Once a statute has been made formally gender-neutral, however, it is subject to heightened scrutiny only if a plaintiff can establish the equivalent of legislative malice: that the gender-neutral statute
was enacted "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon" women. This is precisely the sort of malignant motivation that is least likely
to be uttered in the constitutionally conscious age in
which we live. So, as a practical matter, modem marital
rape exemptions are subject to rational basis review.
Although a small number of state courts have found
exemptions unconstitutional on a rational basis analysis,
a marital rape exemption is likely to survive this relatively unrigorous level of constitutional scrutiny, which asks
only whether the legislature has articulated one reason
for the exemption that the court is willing to accept as
rational.
Modern feminist critics, including most prominently Robin West, have provided an excellent doctrinal
analysis of the status of gender-neutral laws under contemporary equal protection doctrine, and explained the
difficulties that the modem feminist campaign against
the marital rape exemption has encountered as rooted in
the inadequacy of that doctrine. But feminists have not
devoted nearly as much attention to the question of why
the Supreme Court might have chosen to privilege gender-neutral laws in the first place, and whether there is
something more behind the states' move to gender-neutral marital rape exemptions than a desire to survive
constitutional scrutiny. The fate of the historical struggle over marital rape, and the nature of the modem arguments put forth in the exemption's defense, suggest that
the focus on gender-neutralization is tapping into a larger cultural story about mutuality in relations between the
sexes, particularly in marriage.
The effect of the current equal protection doctrine
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on gender-neutrality is to treat men and women as occupying interchangeable roles, in all cases except where
the text of the statute or explicit legislative statements of
malicious intent force the court to do otherwise. It is a
doctrinal methodology for denying the possibility that
the interests of men and women may be unaligned, differentially affected, even antagonistically opposed to one
another, and not interchangeable at all. Marital rape
exemptions are not the only statutes to have undergone
recent revision into a gender-neutral idiom.

. .

. Yet the

strength of the yearning to insist within the law that the
interests of men and women always harmoniously coincide is nowhere more apparent than with the marital
rape exemption, where the sex-specificity of the underlying conduct is extraordinarily pronounced, but equal
protection doctrine nonetheless treats husbands and
wives as though they occupy unassigned positions.
All this indicates that there are deep-seated reasons why the course of the modern effort against marital
rape importantly resembles that of its nineteenth-century predecessor, where feminists campaigning to unseat a
husband's conjugal prerogatives had much less of an
impact on the law than they sought, or won elsewhere.
There is no easy path upon which contemporary feminists might proceed, given the profound and long-lived
societal reluctance-particularly where marital intercourse and reproduction are at issue-to formulate
women's legal rights around the understanding that marital relations are potentially antagonistic and dangerous.
There is, however, a very pertinent difference between
the arena in which the first organized woman's rights
movement operated and the contemporary environment, which suggests that the future fate of the modern
feminist campaign against marital rape need not track
the historical record.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the
proposition that marital rape inflicted severe harm upon
married women was widely acknowledged. The prescriptive literature described this harm in great detail.
Authoritative legal sources, moreover, never denied the
proposition, and courts occasionally remarked upon it
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themselves while deciding divorce cases later in the
century... . In an age that still accepted and endorsed a
vast range of legal structures explicitly subordinating
women to men, this recognition of injury was not
enough to persuade either popular experts on marriage
or lawmakers to repudiate a husband's legal right to rape
his wife.
The modem defenders of the marital rape exemption, in contrast, submerge and deny the harm that the
rule causes women. This has been good strategy for a
reason. It is much more difficult to justify the harm that
marital rape inflicts upon wives, and explain the absence
of legal remediation, in a nation now formally committed to women's legal equality and the undoing of
women's subjection at common law. The historical
record helps make this harm concrete, revealing the
ways in which it is buried by the contemporary defense
of the marital rape exemption. If the injury that marital
rape inflicts was more systematically put at issue, and
arguments presuming that marital relations never cause
women harm were more systematically resisted, it might
be harder for the legal system to continue to shelter a
husband's conjugal prerogatives. Certainly, building on
this excavation of injury would be a useful place for the
modem feminist opposition to marital rape to begin its
work anew.
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